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The Constitution as Architecture: A Charette
LARRY KRAMER*

When I arrived at the University of Chicago Law School to begin teaching
in the fall of 1986, I hardly knew Paul Bator. He was still at Harvard
when I was a law student at Chicago, and while I had worked with him
on a few cases during a summer stint at the Solicitor General's office, our
conversations had been brief. I was, of course, aware of the publicity
accompanying Paul's move to Chicago, which underscored his status as a
leading figure in legal academia. Naturally, then, I was somewhat apprehensive when, soon after my arrival, Paul gave me a copy of his Harris
Lecture and asked for comments. Commenting on the work of colleagues
was something I had anticipated. But now that the task was upon me, I
doubted that I was up to it. What if I had nothing to say? What if what
I had to say was stupid? I imagined Paul reading my letter and wondering
why on earth the faculty offered me a job.
Paul quickly allayed these fears-not by complimenting me on my comments, but by coming to my office to talk about them and by inviting me
to his home for a small group discussion. Being taken seriously by so senior
and distinguished a colleague did wonders for my confidence. But then,
one of Paul's strengths was that he treated everyone as if they had something
interesting to say. Talking to Paul was always challenging and always fun.
Some of Paul's other strengths are revealed in this lecture: his instinctual
feel for law and his matchless ability to explain his instincts with power
and eloquence. My colleagues sometimes refer to Paul's "aesthetic" sensibility; but more than that, Paul had a keen sense of the law's possibilities.
Perhaps balance is the word I want. Paul was able to balance the importance
of immediate social consequences with the need to preserve law's internal
order and beauty. His sensible and sensitive voice will be missed.
In the spirit of reasoned dialogue that Paul cherished, I offer this more
polished version of the letter that I sent Paul in the fall of 1986. Unfortunately, Paul never had a chance to respond, and I do not know for sure
whether he would have accepted or rejected these points. I offer them for
whatever additional light, if any, they shed on the problem addressed in
The Constitution as Architecture.'

* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. J.D., 1984, University
of Chicago; B.A., 1980, Brown University. I am grateful to Albert Alschuler, Steven Gilles,
Michael McConnell, Geoffrey Stone, David Strauss and Cass Sunstein for their helpful

comments.
1. Bator, The Constitution as Architecture: Legislative and Administrative Courts Under
Article III, 65 IND. L.J. 233 (1990).
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First, I agree with Paul that the "categorical" approach to interpreting
article III is a failure. I also agree that the "public rights" exception, as
articulated in Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 2 cannot
be confined in a way that prevents it from swallowing the rule embodied
in Paul's "Simple Model." But I do not think that Paul has succeeded in
proving this latter point. He has demonstrated that the public rights exception has not been confined, but the fact that the Court has failed to define
this exception does not prove that it cannot be done.
The reason the public rights exception cannot be confined is that its
rationale directly contradicts the premises of the Simple Model. The Simple
Model requires life tenure and salary protection to limit the extent to which
Congress and the President can control judges. Under the categorical
approach, the Court recognizes narrow exceptions to these requirements
when additional considerations, not accounted for by this model, justify
removal from the basic framework. But no such considerations justify the
public rights exception. Rather, the public rights exception is justified on
the ground that the greater power not to create a right includes the lesser
power to control the process by which that right is adjudicated-including
the pay and tenure of the adjudicator. It thus repudiates the fundamental
principle of the Simple Model without substituting any other limiting principle in its place.
Second, I think that Paul overstates his case when he claims that adopting
the Simple Model would constitute "a cataclysm in our institutional history."' To make the case as strong as possible, assume that the Simple
Model really would require extending article III protection to every federal
official with significant adjudicatory responsibilities. So what? Paul suggests
that this would make administering federal law too cumbersome, formal
and expensive-a claim that would have merit if article III required all the
trappings presently associated with adjudication in the federal courts. But
black robes and an austere courtroom are not required to satisfy article III;
nor are formal pleadings, discovery or the elaborate, adversarial procedures
of modern litigation. Article III requires only that the adjudicator have life
tenure and salary protection. Questions respecting the kind of hearing this
adjudicator must provide fall under the due process clause, which provides
a great deal of flexibility. Hence, Paul's "worst case" scenario does not
require any change in existing adjudicatory practices other than to give
presiding officials life tenure and salary protection.
Paul acknowledges the possibility of informal adjudication before officials
with article III protection, but observes that "it would not be unmixedly

2. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
3. Bator, supra note 1, at 261.
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wonderful ' 4 to have thousands of tenured bureaucrats. The objection could
be that we do not want to be stuck paying these bureaucrats if there is no
work for them to do. But a significant drop in the federal workload is not
likely. Moreover, even if the federal workload did decrease dramatically,
this wouid present only a short-term transition problem since Congress need
not appoint new judges to replace those who die or retire.
In fact, Paul's chief objection is that extending article III protection to
every adjudicator in the federal bureaucracy might affect "the institutional
perspectives and psychology" 5 of the "small group of revered, elite
generalists ' 6 who currently have such protection. Paul does not explain the
nature of this effect. I assume that he means a loss of prestige-something
many commentators predict would accompany expanding the number of
judges with article III protection. But while decreasing the prestige of federal
judges is not desirable, it hardly constitutes "a cataclysm in our institutional
history." More important, there is no reason to fear this consequence.
Being a federal judge is prestigious principally because of the power these
judges wield. That power will not be diminished by giving life tenure to
other adjudicators with less responsibility. The same small cadre of judges
would remain at the apex of the judicial pyramid, empowered to review all
the others.
Paul might be referring to something other than a loss of prestige. For
example, since independence lessens fears of political manipulation, the
district courts and courts of appeals might begin reviewing agency determinations with greater deference. Yet to the extent that independence does
insulate judges, such deference is not a bad thing. Other than this, I cannot
imagine what Paul could mean. Certainly the mere fact that a decision was
rendered by someone with life tenure creates no psychological or institutional
barrier to vigorous review. Courts of appeals routinely review decisions by
district judges with life tenure.
Third, I nonetheless agree with Paul that article III does not require
giving life tenure and salary protection to every adjudicator in the federal
bureaucracy. As Paul points out, executing a law requires decisions that
are indistinguishable from adjudication in that someone must interpret the
7
law and make a determination about its application in a particular case.
Surely the form in which these decisions are made cannot determine whether
they constitute "execution" or "adjudication." It hardly makes sense to
say that deciding to prosecute under a criminal law is executive if made
informally, but that this same decision becomes adjudication if it is made

4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.

7. The Supreme Court made the same point in Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 733
(1986).
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after a hearing. The Simple Model thus cannot remain simple, for we must
still define what "the judicial Power" is and when it is being exercised.
Fourth, Paul ultimately concludes that the Supreme Court stated the
proper test in Crowell v. Benson:8 a judge with life tenure and salary
protection must have "ultimate judicial control" 9 through the power to
review "whether the law was correctly applied and whether the findings of
fact had reasonable support in the evidence."' 0 While I agree that appellate
review is constitutionally sufficient, some of the arguments on which Paul
relies are unpersuasive. For instance, I give little weight to the argument
that we have a long history of creating special tribunals "not cast in the
rigid article III mold."" Widespread reliance on administrative agencies and
article I courts is, in fact, a relatively recent phenomenon. Non-traditional
adjudication was rare (though not unheard-of) prior to the New Deal, and
even the New Deal established few agencies with significant adjudicatory
responsibilities. The real proliferation of administrative tribunals came in
the 1960's and 1970's. More important, "in for a penny, in for a pound"
is not an especially compelling principle of constitutional interpretation,
particularly if (as suggested above) the consequence of changing courses
would not be drastic.
Similarly, I would not rely on the fact that the Constitution permits state
courts to adjudicate cases enumerated in article III. Drafting the Constitution
required compromise on many issues. One such compromise concerned the
distribution of power between the state and federal governments and made
the creation of federal trial courts optional. 2 But the concerns resolved by
this compromise were distinct from the concerns underlying the separation
of powers, which is designed to prevent concentrations of power within the
national government. Adjudication in state courts is consistent with this
design, as these courts are not subject to control by the political branches
of the federal government. Federal agencies, by contrast, are invariably
controlled by Congress or the President or both. 3 Consequently, the fact
that Congress may leave the adjudication of cases within article III to state
courts does not imply that Congress may also create a federal tribunal to
hear these cases without providing the tenure and salary protections required
by article III.
Fifth, Paul further supports the claim that the Constitution is satisfied
by appellate review before an article III judge by arguing that it is impossible

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

285 U.S. 22 (1932).
Bator, supra note 1, at 267.
Id.
Id. at 239.
See 4 P. KURLAND & R. LERNER, THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 135-39 (1987); THE
FEDERALIST No. 81 (A. Hamilton).
13. See Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the
Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 573 (1984).
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to classify every step of the lawmaking process as "legislative," "executive"
or "judicial" in a way that is not arbitrary. The point is correct, 4 but it
proves too much. It suggests that any stopping place is implausible, that
any fixed definition of separation of powers is impossible. It thus supports
the more radical conclusion that Congress is free to establish any institutional
arrangement that "reasonably" serves legitimate government purposes.
What Paul's analysis lacks, in other words, is an affirmative theory of
separation of powers to explain why the Constitution is not satisfied by less
than appellate review in an article III court. This is not the place to
elaborate such a theory in detail, but it seems useful to sketch the framework
of an understanding of separation of powers that supports Paul's conclusion.
Lawmaking is a complicated, often drawn-out process that begins with
the enactment of a general policy and ends with the translation of this
policy into final determinations of consequences for particular individuals.
The ability to monopolize this process-to decide policy and to control its
implementation in particular cases-would seriously threaten individual rights
and liberty. The separation of powers lessens this threat by dispersing
governmental authority: it divides the lawmaking process into three distinct
phases and requires affirmation from a separate entity in each phase. No
single government body can gather too much power if successful completion
of the process requires the participation of two other, independent bodies. 5
At a minimum, then, the separation of powers requires the preservation
of three distinct phases in the lawmaking process. In my view, moreover,
this is the most that separation of powers requires. The historical evidence
suggests that the Framers' idea of separation of-powers was unformed and
tentative, and that they had few fixed institutional arrangements in mind
beyond the basic principle that there should be a separation.16 Moreover,
as Paul suggests, any detailed schedule of "legislative," "executive" and
"judicial" functions is necessarily arbitrary. Finally, since this minimalist
approach satisfies the essential purpose of separation of powers, imposing
more elaborate restrictions makes governing more difficult for no good
reason.
On this view, defining separation of powers requires only that we articulate
an irreducible minimum necessary for each branch to maintain a meaningful

14. For example, the discussion above suggests that the only difference between "execution"
and "adjudication" is that adjudication comes after and reviews the decisions of those charged
with execution. Similar difficulties in distinguishing functions were encountered in trying to
draw a line between legislation and execution. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 109 S.Ct.
647 (1989); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama
Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
15. An additional benefit of separation of powers is that it proliferates the points of access
for citizen participation in politics.
16. See Casper, An Essay in Separation of Powers: Some Early Versions and Practices,
30 WM. & MARY L. Rav. 211 (1989).
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role in the lawmaking process. Beyond this minimum, institutional arrangements may develop over time in light of experience and expediency.
Support for this approach may be found in the Supreme Court's nondelegation decisions. These cases, which hold that Congress must establish
an "intelligible principle" from which standards can be derived to guide
executive discretion,' 7 define the minimum necessary to preserve Congress'
distinctive role. Congress can do more; Congress can, if it wants, spell out
what a law requires with great particularity. At a minimum, however,
separation of powers requires Congress to make a meaningful initial policy
choice: anything less removes Congress from the lawmaking process and
turns a tripartite system of lawmaking into a bipartite one.18
These non-delegation cases-and the understanding of separation of powers that they implicitly endorse-provide strong support for Paul's interpretation of article III. For parallel reasoning suggests that a similar, minimum
threshold satisfies the constitutional requirement of separation of powers at
the other end of the lawmaking spectrum. At some point, someone must
make a final decision about the consequences of a law for particular
individuals. Separation of powers requires that this decision not be rendered
without meaningful participation by an official with article III protection
(unless it is by a state court). Under the traditional model, this means a
full trial, with de novo determinations of both fact and law. Crowell simply
recognizes that departures from this model are constitutionally permissible
because courts exercising appellate review retain significant power to oversee
and restrain administrative officials. 19
Sixth, this understanding of separation of powers has implications that
require fuller exploration than the present occasion allows. One of these
implications should be mentioned, however. The framework described above
casts doubt on current law respecting Congress' power to vest executive
officials with unreviewable discretion. Separation of powers contemplates a
three-phase lawmaking process. Just as Congress cannot make this into a
two-phase process by delegating its part to the Executive, so it cannot make
it into a two-phase process by excluding the courts. The greater power not

17. See Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 654-58; Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944);
Schechter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. at 495; PanamaRef. Co., 293 U.S. at 388; J.W. Hampton,

Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
18. The Court has similarly preserved a minimal role for the executive. Thus, while Congress
may spell out its policy in great detail, Congress' power ends with passage of a law.
Implementation must be left to officials who are not subject to direct congressional control.
Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 714; INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
19. 285 U.S. at 22. There is little doubt that federal courts of appeals have considerable
influence over district courts. Similarly, federal district courts, exercising the equivalent of
appellate review through habeas corpus procedures, have imposed substantial controls on state
court criminal proceedings. I see no reason to believe that appellate review of agency
determinations is less adequate.
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to pass a law at all does not include the lesser power to pass it subject to
non-participation by article III courts in its implementation.
This does not necessarily mean that every government decision must be
reviewed by article III judges. Like other constitutional doctrines, separation
of powers is not absolute and may yield to a sufficiently compelling
governmental interest. Similarly, there may be certain exceptions that are
either de minimis or that find an historical justification. But the analysis
above does suggest that the circumstances in which Congress can avoid
article III review are narrower than present law permits.
The consequences of requiring judicial review on a wider scope are not
radical. As noted above, someone must make a final decision about what
a law means for particular individuals in a particular case. I am simply
arguing that this final decisionmaker must ordinarily be free of direct
control by the political branches of the federal government. The Constitution
contemplates two ways to do this. Congress may leave the final review to
state courts, an option that probably seemed more acceptable in 1789 than
it often does today. Alternatively, Congress can delegate the final decision
to a federal official with life tenure and salary protection. Separation of
powers does not require a traditional trial in a traditional courtroom.
Congress retains broad power to structure the process of implementing
federal law, subject to the strictures of due process and the seventh amendment. 20 All that article III requires is that the official designated to perform
the final review-in whatever proceeding Congress devises that satisfies these
other constitutional restrictions-not be subject to control by Congress or
the President in terms of salary or tenure. By the same token, however,
article III ordinarily requires that Congress and the Executive surrender
control at least to this extent.

20. See, e.g., Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 109 S. Ct. 2782 (1989).

